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PREFACE 
This study was suggested to me from a statement by 
Piaget in his research on children's .conceptions of time. 
He stated that young children possess all the prerequisites 
for understanding relativity. Obviously, there is a dis-
crepancy between what Piaget believes children can under-
stand and what they are generally expected to understand. 
This raised the question, how could children readily un-
derstand something that is poorly grasped by intelligent 
adults, even after a great deal of study? In the most 
general terms, this study is an attempt to understand cog-
nitive processes in childhood and the forces which affect 
the development of mental abilities. 
Each committee member has made both indirect contri-
butions to the research from material discussed in various 
courses, and direct suggestions for expanding and improving 
the study. The typist and editor, Susan McClure, has con-
tributed to the preparation and completion of the paper. 
My brother Bruce has also helped me meet deadlines, by 
taking care of errands on campus which I could not do my-
self. All these people who have contributed to the study 
are hereby offered my sincere appreciation and recognition. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Social institutions, such as public schools, encourage 
certain ways bf thinking and behaving over others. Public 
education of children is especially concerned with the 
3 R's, i.e., tasks requiring verbal-logical thinking. Many 
educators (such as Ornstein, 1972, and Pearce, 1977) have 
said that children can perform certain cognitive tasks more 
effectively at a younger than at an older age, and they at-
tribute this loss of mental abilities to teaching children 
to rely on verbal-logical thought. At about the age of 
s·ix, children begin to show rapid development of language 
and logic skills and no longer display dependence on devel-
opmentally more primitive mental processes. This study 
examined the relationship of the development of language 
and logic, especially as taught in public schools, to the 
loss of certain mental a_bilities in childhood. 
Rationale 
The loss of certain mental processes may be associated 
with the development of language skills. This phenomenon 
of loss may be understood within the framework of certain 
dualistic psychological theories. The main feature of 
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these theories is that there are two modes of thinking and 
relating to the world that are, to some extent, in conflict 
with each other; thus, what can be processed in one mode 
cannot readily be understood by the other. 
Freud posited the dualistic theory that the mind could 
be divided into two principles, the conscious and the un-
conscious. The unconscious mind is characterized by pri-
mary process thinking, which is instinctive and not subject 
to the critical restrictions of logic. It is presumed that 
children begin with primary process thinking but later must 
develop a secondary process, the conscious mind, which is 
characterized by ego functions. The ego arises from inter-
actions with the external world and is governed by the 
reality principle, whereas the primary process is ruled by 
the pleasure principle (Sahakian, 1974). The ego must try 
to maintain a maximum amount of satisfaction for the un-
conscious forces, while minimizing conflict with the forces 
of society. In minimizing this conflict, functions of the 
unconscious mind--primary proces~es--may be repressed by 
mechanisms of the ego--secondary processes. 
Cognitive development may be viewed as a process in 
which the child manifests a primitive mode of experiencing 
the world, or representing it to consciousness, which 
subsequently is superceded by a more sophisticated repre-
sentation through interaction with members of a civilized 
society. This interaction between child and society 
requires an adaptation on the part of the child; 
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specifically, the child must learn a language, or symbolic 
representation of the universe (Bruner, 1949). In learning 
this language, the child conceives of a model of the uni-
verse governed by implicit laws (all events fall within 
time and space, there is causality, linearity, a subject-
object separation, an actor who acts). The child focuses 
on aspects of his universe which can be understood within 
his symbol system, and he screens all.else from conscious-
ness and the problem-solving process. Rather than acting 
on simple perceptions of the world, the child comes to in-
teract with ~ model or representation of that world. 
Learning a symbolic system of language therefore facilitates 
communication and thus the meeting of needs, but it may 
also result in the loss of contact with the primary 
process. 
Piaget (1929), also, has discussed child development 
as the replacement of one kind of thinking for another, 
which parallels Freud's model, and has provided certain 
descriptions of the child's mind which pertain specifically 
to thinking abilities, rather than to motivation. 
Piaget has de~cribed the development of explanations 
of natural events offered by children as moving from a pre-
causal stage, through a transitional stage in which aspects 
of both precausal and causal explanations are given, to a 
final stage in which the child's explanations are charac-
terized by physical objective causality. The shift from 
precausal thinking to causal thinking reflects a 
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substitution of one way of thinking for another. Piaget 
views intellectual development as the shift in childhood 
from natural innate tendencies to interpret the world in a 
precausal manner (as in the example of animism, in which 
children may attribute the characteristics of life to in-
animate objects) to the use of causal explanations, which 
children learn from interacting with others, especially 
adults. Initially, the child does not differentiate him-
self from his environment and attributes his personal 
characteristics to things around him. The child appears to 
operate from, certain presuppositions; namely, he does not 
separate himself from his environment, he regards his own 
point of view as absolute, and he ignores the fact that his 
own point of view is subjective. Differentiation occurs as 
the child structures a concept of the world as existing ex-
ternally and independently of himself, and in this process 
becomes conscious of himself as an individual entity. 
Piaget views the shift in cognitive development as a 
result of interaction with others. Language acquisition, 
in itself, is not enough to advance development to a causal 
stage. But as language is learned, facts about the envi-
ronment, cultural beliefs, and values are learned which may 
influence the quality of thinking that is to develop. Lan-
guage is seen as just one aspect of many socializing forces. 
It is possible that formal education in reading, writing, 
and arithmetic--tasks of language and logic--also influence 
the child to substitute one way of thinking for another. 
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Objective of the Study 
The objective of the study was to determine whether 
the development of skill in reading, writing, and arith-
metic is related to a decrease in the tendency to use the 
primary process. If, as the model says, learning in the 
verbal-logical mode interferes with the primary process, 
then a significant negative relationship should exist be-
tween measures of the primary and the secondary processes. 
The study tests for a relationship; if the predicted rela-
tionship is obtained, then the model is supported. However 
any obtained relationship is not necessarily causal, and 
the nature of any obtained relationship is still open to 
alternative interpretations. 
Hypotheses 
H1 Animistic thinking is negatively related to age. 
H2 Animistic thinking is negatively related to school 
achievement, even after controlling for age. 
H3 The size-weight illusion is positively related to age. 
H4 The size-weight illusion is positively related to 
school achievement, even after controlling for age. 
H5 Animistic thinking is negatively related to the size-
weight illusion. 
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Definitions 
Primary Process 
The term was first used by Freud to refer to the in-
teraction between assumed elements of the id; the primary 
process is concerned with immediate gratification of animal 
drives, cannot use symbolic representations of experience, 
and is not subject to the critical restrictions of. logic 
(Sahakian, 1974). Pearce (1977) adds to this definition 
that the primary process is the function through which we 
experience unity and wholeness in our environment and 
general field of awareness. 
Exactly what the primary' process is, is hard to state, 
partly because of its nonconceptual nature. The primary 
process is regarded in the present study as a function of 
the right hemisphere mode of thought, as proposed in the 
split-brain model of Ornstein (1972). Both the primary 
process and the right hemisphere are theorized to be (a) 
more operative in childhood, (b) concerned with the per-
ception of wholes, (c) nonlinear, and (d) nonverbal or 
conceptual. The right hemisphere function is described as 
intuitive and involved with rhythm and coordination of body 
movements, music, dreams, imagery, and visual-spatial per-
ception; intuition also is associated with the experience 
of wholeness in the universe. 
Piaget's notions of precausal thinking and animism are 
regarded in this study as products of the primary process 
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because of their presence in childhood, their contradiction 
of logic, and the perception of unity implied in precausal 
statements. 
The freedom from susceptibility to the size-weight 
illusion is also taken here as an indication of the func-
tioning of the primary process. Making judgements based on 
actual density may ref le ct awareness of gravitational forces 
which is not used when a person relies on verbal-logic, as 
is discussed further in Chapter II. 
Secondary Process 
The secondary process is charact~rized by verbal-logic. 
School achievement in reading, writing, and arithmetic is 
considered a function of the secondary process. Further-
more, tasks of language and logic are associated with the 
left cerebral hemisphere. For the purposes of this study, 
a test of school achievement is regarded as a measure of 
the verbal-logical, left-hemisphere, secondary process. 
School Achievement 
School achievement is defined as performance on the 
SRA Assessment Survey, Achievement Series. The SRA pro-
vides measures of mastery of reading, language arts, and 
mathematics. These three subject areas correspond to the 
3 R's; the language arts part of the test deals with alpha-
betization, capitalization, punctuation, pronoun usage, 
verb and sentence usage, adjectives-adverbs, and spelling, 
all of which are subskills of writing. School achievement 
is regarded as a function of the verbal-logical mode, the 
secondary process. 
Size-Weight Illusion 
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The SWI refers to the tendency to confuse the density 
of an object with its weight, so that a person presented 
with two objects of the same weight, but of different sizes, 
will judge the larger object to be lighter. This illusion 
of the larger object seeming lighter has been interpreted 
to be the result of the subject's relying upon his 
"conceptual organization of available sensory data,'' of 
analyzing weight as density; there is a mental set or expec-
tancy that denser is heavier, which leads to an incorrect 
judgement (Pearl, 1972). Susceptibility to the SWI (and 
thus, lack of weight-judging ability) as a result of 
learning a symbolic representation of reality, indicates 
that a loss of the primary process has occurred with devel-
opment. With the SWI test (described in Chapter III) , a 
quantitative measure of the primary process can be obtained. 
Animism 
Animism is the tendency to attribute life and con-
sciousness to surrounding objects, thinking, for instance, 
that clouds are aware of their own motion. It is a spe-
cific form of the more general precausal thinking which is 
defined below. 
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Laurendeau and Pinard (1962) have developed a method-
ology which replicates the clinical investigations of 
Piaget and corrects methodological errors of other re-
searchers; consequently, their scale of animism provided a 
useful tool for determining the stage of thought present in 
children under investigation. Laurendeau and Pinard clas-
sify responses to their animism questionnaire into four 
stages: 
. 0. Incomprehension or Refusal 
1. Animistic Thinking Based upon Usefulness, 
Anthropomorphism, or Movement 
2. Autonomous Thinking with Some Residual 
Animistic Thinking 
3. Total Disappearance of Animistic Thinking 
(pp. vi-vii). 
The loss of animistic thinking is regarded in this study as 
indicative of loss of the primary process. 
Precausal Thinking 
The word precausal is used to describe the child's 
thinking because 
children's questions showed evidence neither of 
any search for the mechanical cause of phenomena 
nor of the search for any logical justification 
of their judge~ents, but pointed only to a search 
for motivation, which was conceived as the only 
possible explanation. In a world filled with and 
animated with intentions, such as the child con-
ceives it to be, the true cause of a phenomenon 
is the moral reason for its happening. Every end 
calls forth the very force which is to realize 
it, and in looking for the 'why' of things, the 
child is also exploring the manner of their pro-
duction. The 'how' is of no interest to him and 
raises no problems (Piaget, 1930, p. 12). 
Lack of differentiation in the child's mind gives rise 
to three adual~sms. First is the confusion between the 
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sign and the significate: the name of an object is insep-
arable from the object. For instance, the child may believe 
that the name of the sun is part of the sun itself and has 
its origin in the sun, and to touch a symbol for the sun is 
to touch th~ sun itself. The second adualism is the con-
fusion between internal and external: thought is believed 
to be situated in the child, as well as outside himself. 
For instance, children believe that dreams exist external 
to themselves and are actually in the room with them. The 
.third variety of adualism is the confusion.between thought 
and matter: .thoughts are believed to have a material sub-
stance. These characteristics of undifferentiation between 
the child and his environment result in precausal thinking. 
Piaget (1930) has identified five main forms of pre-
causal thinking in children which, he believes, reflect the 
child's innate predispositibn for understanding the world: 
(1) Phenomenism is the most primitive form of precausal 
thinking used by children in their representation of 
reality. It is the establishing of a causal link between 
phenomena which appear together in space or time, or are 
similar to each other. Since the child is unaware of the 
subjective nature of such connections, he tends to relate 
everything to anything. For instance, the child may explain 
the floating of an object in water by referring to its 
color. This tendency to believe in the interrelatedness of 
all things manifests itself in the magical beliefs of chil-
dren. For instance, the child may believe that he can 
11 
direct the. motion of celestial bodies by the action of his 
own will, which is in contact with all other things. The 
child may attempt to inf luerice the actions of external 
objects by manipulating symbol$ for the objects (which are 
indistinguishable for the child). (2) Finalism is the be-
lief that the world is organized along well laid plans, 
almost always centered around human activity. Every object 
has a purpose, and this purpose is the reason for its exis-
tence and characteristics. Dreams, for example, may exist 
to punish the dreamer, or trees exist to provide shade for 
men. (3) Artificialism builds on finalism and refers to 
the belief that the origin of things is in the actions of 
someone who makes them, either God or man. (4) Animism is 
the tendency to attribute life and consciousness to sur-
rounding_ objects, such as clouds being aware of their 
motion. (5) Dynamism is related to animism but refers to 
attributing an independent will to objects, such as clouds 
being able to choose their own course and move without as-
sistance. Piaget emphasizes that these ideas children have 
are not the product of careful reasoning; rather they re-
flect an innate attitude or predisposition of the child's 
mind to uncritically accept certain assumptions. 
Of the five forms of precausal thinking, animism has 
received the most attention from other researchers. Thus, 
·this study will choose animism to exemplify a form of 
thinking which children lose as they develop. 
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. Primitive 
The word primitive is used to describe two quite dif-
ferent conditions which both, nevertheless, indicate an 
early stage of development. Primitive may describe the 
child's thinking, compared to that of an adult, given the 
same modern western culture. Primitive may also describe 
pretechnological societies which have not adopted charac-
teristics of modern civilization. The use of primitive to 
describe both children and pretechnological societies may 
lead to the erroneous conclusion that, with regard to cog-
nitive development, a child of the United States is in all 
ways like an adult tribesman living in the jungles of 
Africa. Although there are some similarities (which are 
discussed in Chapter II), the word primitive simply connotes 
a lower or beginning stage of development. In this study, 
usage of the word should be clear from context. Of signi-
f icance to this research is that the· thinking of the child 
and the thinking of some African tribesmen are both char-
ac~erized by animism. 
Socialization 
Socialization_is that aggregate of 
activities that are devoted to the inculcation 
and elicitation of basic motivational and cog-
nitive patterns through ongoing and spontaneous 
interaction with parents, siblings, kinsmen, and 
other members of the community (Cohen, 1971, p. 22). 
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Education 
Education is seen as. part of socialization in general, 
but it is concerned with "the inculcation of standardized 
and stereotyped knowledge, skills, values, and attitudes by 
means of standardized and stereotyped procedures" (Cohen, 
19 71, p. 2 2) • 
Implications 
Critics of education have contended that training in 
the verbal-logical mode interferes with the development of 
valuable characteristics already present in children; 
schools are out of balance, they maintain, since they pro-
vide experiences designed to encourage appreciable devel-
opment of reading, writing, and arithmetic skills, but 
virtually ignore primary processing. Advocates of the open 
classroom believe that schools should delay formal in-
struction until the child is ready and shows a desire to 
learn. The purpose of delaying formal instruction is to 
allow the lower stage processes to become firmly estab-
lished, thereby providing a foundation for higher levels of 
cognition. It might be easier to develop and maintain 
access to primary processes up through childhood than to 
try to retrieve such in adults. 
Another educational trend is the attempt to "get back 
to basics ''--the basics being the 3 R' s--at as early an age 
as possible. Educators who emphasize the importance of 
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early education in the 3 R's, consider such educational goals 
important to the student's successful adaptation to his en-
vironment. It is thus believed that children who acquire 
reading, writing, and arithmetic skills (important tools of 
language, logic, and communication in general) will be 
better prepared to meet their needs and make a healthy 
adaptation to life that.allows for the greatest expression 
of human potential (Biehler, 1974). Indeed, students who 
do master verbal-analytical skills are in a distinctly ad-
vantageous position for succeeding, both in and outside of 
school. Implied in this notion of mental development is 
that the sooner the child begins high-level learning, the 
better. 
Man needs high-level cognitive processes to function 
in the modern world and deal with the problems confronting 
survival. Making good decisions requires utilizing all 
personal resources and available information. Logical de-
cisions must be based on factual premises. But developing 
dependence upon a symbolic mode of thought may interfere 
with one's ability to utilize certain sensory information 
and primary processing. The emergence of secondary pro-
cessing results in focusing on what fits the limits of the 
secondary process iriput requirements. If secondary pro-
cesses inhibit operation of primary processes, then some 
provisions may be necessary when a person is engaged in an 
activity which requires primary processing. 
Attempting to integrate both processes in the 
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educational program may require special activities, teaching 
techniques, and media designed to exercise the primary mode 
in addition to the opposing secondary mode. It is not 
practical for public scho6ls to delay formal education in-
definitely; hence, many programs have appeared to provide 
experiences with psychological processes, other than the 
3R's. Canfield and Klimek (1978) recommend discussion of 
dreams, meditation, visualization, guided fantasy,.music 
and dance, and biofeedback as means of blending the ele-
ments of .imagination, intuition, sensory awareness, and a 
sense of purpose into education for training right hemi-
sphere skills. A common feature of these activities is 
that those engaged in them are often instructed not to think 
or conceptualize. Ornstein (1972) says that the purpose of 
these activities is to suppress the active verbal-logical 
mode, "to rid the practitioner of a strict reliance on 
verbal intellectuality" (p. 156). Ideally, students could 
learn to switch back and forth between modes, as needed. 
The model of Ornstein (1972), for which this study attempted 
to find support, has some implications for educating both 
hemispheres of the brain. The verbal-logic of the left 
hemisphere tends to dominate and repress the intuition of 
the right hemispher~. Hence, if one wishes to utilize the 
right hemisphere, he may first have to tune out the left, 
avoiding conceptualization in those tasks requiring right 
hemisphere processing, such as dancing. Avoiding concep-
tualization in the early stages 6f problem solving may 
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actually be an effective aid in determining the final most 
reasonable conclusion. According to some mathematicians, 
logic must proceed originally from intuitions. It seems 
reasonable that one would try to work from the broadestbase 
possible, in order to establish the most accurate intuitions 
from which deductions can be made. At the beginning of 
formal education, a child presumably still relies to some 
extent on the right hemisphere primary process, but he is 
taught to use the left. If the child subsequently loses 
access to the right hemisphere in the educational prociess, 
then education has at once provided the child with a model 
for understanding the world yet taken away the direct ex-
perience of that world which the model should help clarify. 
Just as the left hemisphere may interfere with the 
right, so also may the opposite be true. One may have to 
set aside lower-level thinking, in order to effectively use 
concepts and solve problems requiring language. 
Since animism is basic to a child •·s thinking, he is 
likely to seek explanations to his most pressing concerns 
about how to deal with life in terms of animism (Bettelheim, 
1976). For this reason fairy tales, which contain rivers 
that talk and animals that give advice, can provide the 
child with solace for his concerns and offer explanations 
that are more acceptable than logical explications. Ideas 
may be presented to adult and child, alike, through the 
metaphors of myths and fairy tales, since such stories 
speak to the primary process, which does not translate 
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directly into logical concepts. May (1969) says thatpeople 
need myths to believe in, to give meaning to life; it 
should be noted that myths tend to reflect many of the pre-
causal beliefs of childhood (examples of which appear in 
the following chapter) . To ensure the development of 
mental health, as well as intellectual excellence, educators 
might do well to recognize this primary mode of thinking in 
children. There is evidence that adults, too, resort to 
animistic thinking under circumstances of str~ss or 
ambiguity (Laurendeau and Pinard, 1962). 
If cultural institutions do primarily reinforce the 
verbal-logical mode, and, as some critics maintain, ignore 
all other modes of thought, then the development of primary 
process thought may be left to random influences or to 
counter-cultural forces. Jung (1961) has stated that there 
is an innate tendency toward balance of all psychological 
forces in a person; a person may seek experiences which 
provide needed stimulation or emotional outlet in order to 
gain balance. ·.If there is no outlet then mental illness 
may result, due to repression of a part of the self. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Since the nineteenth century, considerable systematic 
observation and research .has been conducted, accompanied by 
a great deal of theorizing and speculation. This study will 
now survey the literature pertinent to respective topics 
under consid~ration in the model. Interpretations of 
current social phenomena within the context of the model 
will also be discussed. An attempt will be made to show 
that the organization of psychological processes, in par-
. ticular the relation of language to other processes, cor-
responds to the demands for survival and adaptation within 
society; the relative strength of language to other skills 
is affected by the developmental program usually provided by 
cultural institutions. Evidence that the development of 
language inhibits the primary process will be presented. 
A central belief has endured throughout the history of 
civilization that there are forces of socialization which 
act to inhibit the full development of intelligence, and 
that in becoming a part of society a child sacrifices some 
valuable part of his mind. This belief that intelligence is 
stunted by socialization is part of the broader myth of the 
Fall of Man. 
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We see this theme of lost certainty and 
splendor not only stated by all the religions of 
man throughout history, but also again and again 
in nonreligious intellectual history. It is there 
from the reminiscence theory of the Platonic 
Dialogues, that everything new is really a re-
calling 9f a lost better world, all the way to 
Rousseau's complaint of the corruption of natural 
man by the artificialities of civilization. And 
we see it also ... in Marx's assumption of a 
lost 'social childhood of mankind where mankind 
unfolds in complete beauty,' ... an innocence 
corrupted by money, a paradise to be regained. Or 
in the Freudian emphasis on the deep-seatedness of 
neurosis in civilization and of dreadful pri-
mordial acts and wishes in both our racial and 
individual pasts; and by inference a previous in-
nocence, quite unspecified, to which we return 
through psychoanalysis. Or in behaviorism, if 
less distinctly, in the undocumented faith that it 
is the chaotic reinforcements of development and 
the social process that must be controlled and 
ordered to return man to a quite unspecified ideal 
before these reinforcements had twisted his true 
nature awry (Jaynes, 1976, p. 444). 
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In the civilizing process, man increasingly divides his 
rational consciousness from his primitive unconscious. 
Samuels (1975) interprets the evolution of civilization in 
terms of "the waxing and waning of two basic mental pro-
cesses: verbal thought and visual thought" (p. 11). 
Primitive man's basic mental process was visual represen-
tation; dreams and fantasies were valued over cognitive 
thought, and he was in harmonious connection with his envi-
ronment. All things participated in the same spirit as man. 
In precausal thinking, an interrelatedness is perceived and 
valued over discriminating functions of thought. The de-
velopment of written language and the accumulation and 
organization of knowledge helped rational thought achieve 
dominance down through the ages. 
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Historically, it has been observed that certain mental 
abilities tend to be incompatible with others. Sir Francis 
Galton, a pioneer researcher in the field of intelligence, 
"remarked on the astonishing finding that scientists in 
general had poor imagery, and specifically commented on the 
antagonism between sharp mental imagery and abstract 
thought" (Rimland, 1978, p. 79). And "Nietzsche once re-
marked that 'many a man fails to become a thinker for the 
sole reason that his memory is too good! 11 (Rimland, p. 79) • 
Localization of Psychological Processes 
in the Brain 
A current popular theory of dualism which postulates 
two mutually exclusive psychological processes is based on 
research which demonstrates that the two hemispheres of the 
cerebral cortex are specialized to perform different func-
tions (Ornstein, 1972). The left hemisphere performs the 
verbal-analytical skills, such as reading, writing, and 
arithmetic, which are localized in the left side of the 
brain. The functioning of the right hemisphere is special-
ized in perceiving visual-spatial relations and has been 
described as intuitive, holistic, and creative. Ornstein 
(1972) observed that, like western culture in general, 
"western education is heavily dominated by the verbal-
analytical mode" (p. 145), schools generally having ignored 
the right hemisphere processes. At school, students are 
trained to focus on certain perceptions processed in the 
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left hemisphere and disregard others, notably those ema-
nating from the right hemisphere. While this perceptual 
selectivity in favor of the verbal-analytic mode may have 
survival value, the automatic selection of only left hemi-
sphere perceptions necessitates the individual's paying less 
attention to all other perceptions, namely those processed 
in the right hemisphere. Thus it would appear that formal 
education, which primarily emphasizes the 3R's, has lost 
sight of potentially valuable mental abilities and is not 
acting in the best interests of full human development. 
Ornstein emphasizes the importance of developing the 
functions of both hemispheres and says that scientific 
activity requires both modes working complementarily; the 
right hemisphere is good for generating possible relation-
ships between data, but since all patterns proposed may not 
correspond to reality, the proposed patterns should be sub-. 
jected to the critical analysis of the left hemisphere. 
Galin (1976) has described the importance of both modes by 
saying that 
the verbal-analytic style is extremely efficient 
for dealing with the object world. Our modern 
technology, standard of living, and scientific 
achievements depend heavily on highly developed 
linear, analytic methods. 
The holistic mode of information processing 
is very good for bridging gaps; we can perc~ive a 
pattern even when some of the pieces are missing. 
In contrast, a logical, sequential mode c~nnot 
skip over gaps. In this imperfect world, since we 
are usually trying to operate from incomplete in-
formation, we very badly need to have a capacity 
to perceive general patterns and jump across gaps 
in present knowledge (p. 18). 
Galin also says that although, ideally, the two modes 
should function in a complementary fashion, they 
also may be in conflict; some mutual antagonism 
is evident between the analytic and the holistic. 
The tendency of the left hemisphere to note the 
details in a form suitable for expression in 
words seems to interfere with the perception of 
overall patterns (p. 18). 
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If this is so, it may be that children lose the use of 
right hemisphere functions as they become proficient in the 
use of the left hemisphere. Pearce (1977) claims that 
children possess ESP, perfect musical pitch, and intuition, 
associated with the right hemisphere, but when they begin 
to specialize in left hemisphere functions these abilities 
are lost. Rennels (1977) says that in emphasizing the 
3 R's, educators have neglected human capacities for imag-
ination and visual-perceptual thinking. 
The schools systematically suppress opportunities 
for children to exercise their visual/sensory 
abilities; ... children should be given the 
appropriate synthetic, sensory, visual, and per-
ceptual experiences (p. 65). 
Continued sensory stimulation is needed, if the "innate 
capacities of individuals are to remain functional rather 
than . atrophy" (Rennels, 1977, p. 65). Schools may 
simply ignore certain mental abilities, or they may 
actively suppress .them, or both. Also, it appears likely 
that activation of one hemisphere may inhibit the activity 
of the other. 
McDougall (1928) considers animism, i.e., a belief in 
the spiritual basis of the uni verse, to be the philosophical 
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polar opposite of materialism, i.e., the belief in matter as 
the fundamental aspect of everything; a comparison may be 
made to the split-brain model. The lateralization of brain 
functions has been used to account for all kinds of polar 
opposites: conscious and unconscious; rational and in-
tuitive; science and art (Goleman, 1977). However, the 
localization of abilities is not the same for everyone; 
language and logic are localized in the left hemisphere in 
only about two-thirds of the population, estimates Goleman. 
Also, the separation of functions is not absolute; there is 
duplication of functions in each hemisphere, and the two 
share in creating many behaviors and experiences within 
consciousness. Some research indicates that women show the. 
separation of function less clearly than men, suggesting 
that women's brains may be organized differently. 
Pearce (1977) has posited that cognitive development 
reflects a shift from dependence on right hemisphere 
functions to specialization of thought appropriate for the 
left hemisphere, the lower stage reflecting the right hemi-
sphere, and th~ higher stage manifesting the functioning of 
the left. This shift in hemispheres which is regarded as 
the neurological basis for the shift from precausal to 
causal thinking, occurs around the age of six, when most 
children are given instruction in the 3 R's at school. 
The popular contention that over half of the brain is 
not used raises some interesting questions for Sagan (1977). 
This, supported by the fact that large portions of the brain 
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may be removed without apparent effect on behavior, does not 
take into account redundancy of function, and the fact that 
much human behavior and experience is subtle: lesions in 
the right hemisphere may lead to impairment of thought and 
action, but in the non-verbal realm, which is difficult for 
doctor and patient to describe. The separation of function 
by hemisphere is considered an adaptation to the need for 
two incompatible thought processes. The cerebral cortex 
evolved because it served Survival and functions, in part, 
by inhibiting the more primitive parts of the brain. But 
the old brain still functions, and it is either still nec-
essary or cannot be entirely bypassed by the rest of the 
brain. Another explanation offered for hemispheric spe-
cialization is that because the child acquires language be-
fore he has complete competence in perception of visual-
spatial relations, the right hemisphere specializes in 
visual perception by default, and the left hemisphere is re-
directed toward language, exclusively. 
Autism 
Some case studies of autistic children provide support 
for the split-brain theory (Rimland, 1978). Autistic 
children display gross disturbances in their abilities to 
communicate, and many do not talk at all. However, about 
10% of these children display extraordinary abilities in 
mathematical computation and exhibit mechanical, musical, 
and artistic talent. Remarkably, in those cases that 
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recover, the special abilities are los~ in the process. 
Rimland notes that a common feature of these autistic sa-
vants is their ability for intense, focused concentration, 
but their inability to look at a broad spectrum. The 
autistic savant "is able to 'apprehend' visual or auditory 
stimuli, but not to 'comprehend' them" (Rimland, p. 78). 
The special abilities they demonstrate are those generally 
considered to be localized in the nondominant right hemi-
sphere. He notes research showing a high rate of left 
temporal lobe abnormality in autistic patients. Rimland 
suspects that the autistic savant is able to perform math-
ematical computations at a remarkable speed because he 
grasps and processes all information simultaneously, rather 
than logically and sequentially. 
Size-Weight Illusion 
In corning to rely upon a model, symbolization, or con-
ceptualization of reality, rather than attending to simple 
perceptions, people may become victims of various distorted 
ideas or perceptions, as is illustrated in the size-weight 
illusion (SWI) . It has been observed that children below 
the age of four years do not experience the SWI, and the 
illusion becomes apparent only shortly thereafter {Ohwaki, 
1953, cited in Werber and King, 1962). (Details concerning 
how this observation was made were not given.) This appear-
ance of susceptibility to the SWI may be related to the 
development of language and reliance upon symbolic logic. 
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The increase in size-weight illusion with development 
may likewise be interpreted as a result of the child's re-
liance on left hemisphere, symbolic processing, rather than 
attending to the direct sensory perception. Marijuana, and 
possibly other drugs which inhibit conceptual thought, may 
cause an adult to regain access to the primary process and 
thus be more proficient at tasks, such as the SWI, than 
under nondrugged conditions (Pearl, 1972). This is con-
gruent with the observation that left hemisphere activity 
decreases relative to the right hemisphere when the subject 
is under the· influence of a psychedelic (Ornstein, 1972). 
Details regarding the SWI will be given in Chapter III. 
Eidetic Imagery 
The incidence of eidetic images, i.e., a strong visual 
memory, is higher in children than in adults; the explanation 
is that in literate societies, emphasis is placed on verbal 
memory over immediate recall of visual images (Haber and 
Haber, 1964). Giray and Barclay (1977) find eidetic imagery 
negatively correlated to age in brain-damaged children ob-
served over a twenty-month period. The authors hypothesize 
that eidetic imagery decreases in importance in the course 
of intellectual development. It is difficult to find suppo~t 
for such a hypothesis because of problems inherent in 
methodology and finding subjects. Doob (1964) finds the in-
cidence of eidetic imagery high in samples of children and 
adults of the Ibo tribe of eastern Nigeria. For this group 
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of Africans there was a higher incidence of eidetic imagery 
in rural than city dwellers; incidence was higher in chil-
dren than adults in the urban sample, but not rural; inci-
dence was higher in rural adults than city-dwelling adults, 
but there was no difference between samples of children. 
Suggested problems for further research are: (1) determine 
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if eidetics are really negatively correlated to age and 
schooling or the western style o;E culture; and ( 2) determine 
the significance that kinds of images in one's memory have 
for modes of social communication. Primitive psychology 
and the impact of culture will be discussed in more detail 
later in this study. 
Dreams 
Psychoanalytically oriented psycholog1sts have tradi-
tionally held the dreams of children in special regard. 
Before logical thought has developed, the primary process 
is. more powerful and pervasive. The primitive forces of 
the unconscious express themselves in dreams; these prim-· 
itive forces are strongest and most easily observed in the 
dreams of children, for whom the repressive action of the 
ego is not yet operative. In dreams, adults are thotight to 
regress to a primitive state of consciousness and gain ac-
cess to the primary process (Foulkes, 1978). Current re-
search does not support the belief that children's dreams 
are more complex and traumatic than adults'. However, some 
evidence indicates children have the ability to recall their 
dreams more easily than adults, and the content of their 
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dreams does reflect presumptions of a precausal sort (Sagan, 
1977). The prevalence of dreams in childhood may be under-
stood as a function of the analytic part of the brain not 
working to full capacity. The dream state, as a product of 
the primitive processes of the unconscious, may reflect a 
shift of dominant hemispheres from left to right. The dream 
is a state 
where we recognize 'signs,' such as the feel of 
running water and the smell of hdneysuckle, but 
have an extremely limited repertoire of symbols 
such as words; where we encounter vivid sensory 
and emotional images and active intuitive under-
standing, but very little rational analysis; where 
we are unable to perform .tasks requiring extensive 
concentration; where we experience short attention 
spans and frequent distractions and, most of all, 
a very feeble sense of individuality or self 
(Sagan, 1977, pp. 150-151). 
The evolutionarily more primitive parts of the brain, 
the midbrain and the limbic system, working in conjunction 
with the right hemisphere, are considered the source of 
dreams, myths, and fairy tales. The significance of dreams 
and the regression to a "primitive animal-like unreasonable 
state of mind" for wish-fulfillment and problem solving has 
been speculated upon for centuries. Sagan (1977) believes 
dream insights "always have an intuitive or pattern-recog-;-
nition character" (p. 171). 
Animism 
Not all researchers find evidence of animism in child-
hood, as described by Piaget (Klingensmith, 1953; Mead, 1932; 
Huang and Lee, 1945), but differences in results can be 
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explained by differences in methodology (Laurendeau and 
Pinard, 1962). The studies not finding clear evidence of 
childhood animism considered the child's classification of 
objects as alive or not alive, but.animism becomes evident 
when the child's explanation is taken into account (Smeets, 
1973). A child may respond that a tree is not alive be-
cause it does not move; movement is a general characteristic 
of animals, and so the child may incorrectly generalize 
that movement equals life--an error observable only when 
considering the explanation given by the child for his 
classification of objects. Adults have been observed to 
exhibit animistic thinking, but it is questionable whether 
childhood animism has all the implications of adult animis~ 
tic beliefs and spontaneous actions (Klingensmith, 1953). 
Piaget (1929) notes similarities between childhood thinking 
and the psychology of primitive societies, which are often 
characterized by animistic and magical ideas; however, 
whether they are of the same process is open to debate. 
McNew ( 19 7 3) provides three reliable and valid measures 
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of animism to support the existence of this kind of thinking 
in childhood, and she notes that animism is negatively re-
lated to age. From a factor analytic study using first 
graders, animism emerged as relatively independent of 33 
variables, including operational thought and reasoning about 
interpersonal relations (Berzonsky, 1973). Stern (1966) 
presented tests and demonstrations to which children gave 
explanations, and he observed that young children do giye 
30 
precausal, nonmechanical explanations for the demonstra-
tions. Stern (1966) notes that general characteristics of 
children's explanations involve 
lack of attention to details of how things happen, 
lack of understanding of temporal sequences of 
events, and the lack of understanding of the need 
for spatial contact for the transfer of energy 
and motion (p. 4116). 
A stand.ardized animism questionnaire was administered 
to 98 Hopi Indian children, ages 12-18 years, by Dennis 
(1943). The Hopi children were more animistic than white 
children of the same age. The concepts of the Hopi and the 
white children were of the same types; the difference in 
the rate of the shift from precausal to causal thought may 
be due to cultural factors which are not isolated in this 
study. Tomlinson and Keasy (1972) found that second-grade 
children are less animistic than children were in 1929. 
The explanation offered is that the emphasis on science is. 
now greater. Torrance·(l972) sampled fourth and sixth 
graders in metropolitan areas of the United States and 
Mexico. Results showed that U.S. children are more causal 
than Mexican children; sixth graders are more causal than 
fourth graders; and advantaged youngsters are more causal 
than their disadvantaged counterparts. Torrance suspects 
the shift in mode of thought to be related to the slump in 
creativity which he observed in the fourth grade. Looft 
and Charles (1969) presented an instructional film on the 
biological nattire of life to 35 children, ages 7-9 years. 
Comparison of pre-test/post-test results showed that some 
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children were able to make a significant change in thought 
from precausal to causal. Three general types of responses 
to the film were prominent: one group was unaffected; one 
group was confused--they retained the information but did 
not "accomodate it"; the third group definitely showed 
alteration of thinking. The authors suggest that the tran-
sition in mode of thought is not necessarily a slowly un-
folding process, as Piaget described; rather, it is possible 
to alter the thinking of some children. Mikulak (1970) 
found animistic tendencies in 59.8% of a sample of 127 
college students. No significant difference was found be-
tween students who had taken one or more courses in biology, 
versus. those who had taken none. 
Another finding of interest to this study is one 
showing that children are aware of the distinction of animate 
versus inanimate in certain verbal contexts, but perceptual 
features of movement and sound are often more salient; the 
verbal perspective serves to control animistic thinking 
(Margand, 1975). Generally, no sex differences are found in 
any of these studies. 
Cross-Cultural Studies 
Some evidence to support the hypotheses underlying this 
study may be found through cross-cultural comparisons. The 
impact of culture upon development of mental abilities can 
be estimated to some extent by comparing societies which are 
different and observing those differences in their respective 
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psychologies. Animism, for instance, is characteristic of 
some primitive peoples' psychologies {Tyler, 1969). As the 
thinking of the child seems to come in conflict with adult 
thought, so does the thinking of primitives compare to that 
which is dominant in western technological nations~ 
Many researchers interpret observations made on prim-
itives to indicate.that such people are of low intelligence 
{Radin, 1927). However, one salient trait of the primitive 
is that "he allows full and appreciative expression to his 
sensations" {p. 19). Decision making aided by sensations, 
emotions, and intuition. is typical of primitive thought. 
Radin believes this nonintellectual thought may be as 
effective as rational analysis. Radin discounts another 
basic assumption of contemporary anthropologists, namely, 
that the primitive personality lacks differentiation and 
integration. Instead, he maintains, the primitive bases no 
ethical judgement on emotion, so he thereby achieves a 
balance of repression and expression in his personality. 
Western Europeans differ from primitives, Radin (1927) says, 
only in their use of the "written word and the technique of 
thinking elaborated on its basis" {p. 387). 
And yet, many observers have been struck and puzzled 
by the differences between Europeans and African tribes. 
Bredsford (1935) notes that when social and political in-
stitutions of western nations are overthrown, new insti-
tutions arise to replace them. However, a survey. of colonial 
history reveals to him that "savage tribes tend to die out 
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when tribal authority is removed or destroyed" (p. 3). The 
primitive seems to have no individuality outside of his 
institutions; his authorities and institutions are bound up 
with customs and traditions characterized by phobias, 
taboos, and magical beliefs, resulting in a stagnation of 
cultural development. Like the child, the primitive has an 
outlook which is susceptible to corruption by the lack of 
discriminating intellect. Bredsford describes the education 
of the white race as concerned with the development of the 
individual as an entity, but says the savage is taught to 
take his place in the social order. 
Primitive philosophy is characterized by participation, 
as well as animism. The primitive believes in a universal 
cause for all things, in a symbiosis of the essence of all 
things, and in the possibility of participating personally 
in this universal life essence. The word "participation" 
has been used to refer specifically to the relation that a 
primitive man might believe to exist between similar phe-
nomena, although there is no spatial contact or causal 
connection apparent. Piaget observed that participation is 
characteristic also of the child. Participation is illus-
trated in the behavior of hitting a picture or symbol of 
something or someone in anger, an action which children and 
primitives have claimed actually affects the object or 
person represented. There is confusion between the object 
and its representation, between self and world. Compared to 
adults, the child--like the primitive--is close to inunediate 
experience and, paradoxically, further from a reality of 
logical coherence. 
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Segall (1963) compared the performance of Europeans to 
African and Philippino adults and children on tests of 
visual perception of geometric illusions, in which the task 
was to judge the longer of two lines. Results indicated 
that non-Westerners were not only less susceptible to the 
Mliller-Lyer illusion ("in which direct and reversed arrow-
heads make lines of identical length appear to be unequal" 
[Harriman, 1969, p. 112]), but also more susceptible to the 
horizontal-vertical illusion than were the Europeans; this 
is consistent with cross-cultural comparisons made by 
Rivers (1924). Segall takes an empiricist, rather than a 
nativist, interpretation and postulates that visual response 
habits are a function of cultural and ecological factors in 
the visual environment. For example, the prevalence of 
rectangularity, i.e., straight lines and square corners in 
the environment, is a factor "related to the tendency to 
interpret acute and obtuse angles on a two-dimensional sur-
face as representative of rectangular objects in three-
dimensional space" (Segall, 19 6 3, p. 9 9) . Such an inference 
is valid for people who live in houses of modern cities, 
but not for those living in open terrain or the jungle. 
Mundy-Castle (1966) claims to show that pictorial 
depth perception in children from Ghana is culturally 
affected by familiarity with pictorial material. Not only 
did the African children show less ability to understand 
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pictures, but more important was their great tendency to 
explain their reasoning with "projected imaginative 
elaborations." The author interprets this in Piagetian 
terms, noting an identification of the child with the event 
or object being described. There was not much sign of an 
attempt to integrate sets of answers into a logical whole. 
Instead, the child focused on the."needs, motivations, and 
feelings of the characters in the pictures: they are not 
regarded as static, symbolic representations, but as direct 
and animated aspects of reality'' (p. 291). The child's logic 
proceeds from this viewpoint of one aspect of the picture at 
a time; the thinking is egocentric, dominated by 
immediate experience, [which] is more syncretic 
than deductive, and [which] operates according to 
special laws of symbolism and immediate satis-
factions. Transitions from premise to deduction 
occur abruptly without intervening deductive steps, 
and little heed is given to proving or checking. 
propositions, or fitting them together into a 
logically coherent whole (Mundy-Castle, 1966, p. 292). 
The Australian aborigines' concept of time provides a 
good example of animism and its place in primitive culture 
(Priestley, 1964). Aboriginals believe everyone possesses 
an eternal soul; at death the spirit goes not only to a 
different geographic location, but also exists in a time 
qualitatively different from the unidirectional, unidimen-
sional flow. The aborigines go to this "Great Time" where 
everything occurs at once in dreams also. Their society 
has many rituals and totems, based on gaining access to 
"eternal dream time." This seems to reflect the need for 
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gaining access to the right hemisphere processing. Likewise 
many esoteric meditation practices, such as repeating a word 
over and over or concentrating upon a single point, are 
oriented toward achieving an experience of timelessness, in-
describable in words and lending an intuitive glimpse of 
ultimate truth. These exercises are popularly interpreted 
in many terms of the split-brain model; activities, such as 
chanting a mantra, tend to inhibit the left hemisphere and 
permit access to the right. 
Language and Primitive Psychology 
The way in which words and language are used reflects 
the psychology of the user. Jung, among others, has 
attempted to provide a general understanding of language and 
the conscious mind from observations of primitive societies. 
Observing that mythical themes are produced in the 
psychoses and the dreams of individuals who could not have 
been acquainted with systems of mythology, Jung (1958) con-
cludes that the expression of mythical ideas is the product 
of myth-forming structures in the unconscious (archetypes). 
These archetypal preconceptions can be observed operating in 
primitive tribes. "Primitive mentality differs from the 
civilized chiefly in that the conscious mind is far less 
developed" (p. 116); the primitive does not think willfully 
and logically, rather he believes thoughts appear to him. 
"The primitive cannot assert that he thinks; it is rather 
that 'something thinks in him'" (p. 116). Similarly, the 
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precausal child regards his thoughts as material objects 
associated with the workings of the mouth, and only later 
does he recognize thought as nonmaterial and occurring inside 
the head. 
Prior to the development of a civilization based on 
verbal logic and symbolization, man's mind may have been 
organized differently; the left hemisphere probably did not 
dominate and suppress functions of the right hemisphere. 
The early records of man reflect the phenomenon of thought 
being material. 
The words in the Iliad that in a later age come to 
mean mental things have different meanings, all of 
them more concrete. The word psyche, which later 
means soul or conscious mind, is in most instances 
life-substances, such as blood or breath; a dying 
warrior bleeds out his psyche onto the ground or 
breathes it out in his last gasp (Jaynes, 1976, p. 69). 
The primitive mentality[ in which myths supposedly are 
produced and originally were formed, is a 
state of reduced intensity of consciousness (in 
dreams, delirium, reveries, visions, etc.). In 
all these states the check upon unconscious con-
tents by the concentration of the conscious mind 
ceases, so that hitherto unconscious material 
streams, as though from opened side sluices, into 
the field of consciousness (Jung, 1958, p .. 118). 
In speaking of archetypes, Jung says it is impossible to 
define them exactly, interpretable metaphorically at best. 
It is the nature of the unconscious that it cannot be re-
duced to concepts upon which the rational mind can perform 
operations. The conscious mind is characterized by language, 
and language itself is a metaphor or a model of the universe 
through which experience is interpreted. Jaynes (1976) 
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describes consciousness as a metaphor for external reality: 
understanding something comes through finding a metaphor for 
it. The difficulty of defining consciousness is finding 
something in our immediate experience that is like our im-
mediate experience. The problem also.can be seen in terms 
of the part trying to analyze the whole. In defining some-
thing one must limit it, thereby eliminating certain aspects 
of the experience; in so doing, the whole is lost. Concepts 
of life and reality likewise pose problems of definition for 
science. 
The archetype must be interpreted to be healthy to 
ensure good connection between conscious and unconscious. 
Since men continue to speak of myths of child-gods, re-
gressing primary mental processes, and reminiscences of a 
golden age, the analogy may hold from individuals to 
societies at large. Jung (1958) observes that 
humanity, too, probably always comes into conflict 
with its childhood state, that is with its 
original, unconscious, and instinctive state, and 
that the danger of the kind of conflict which in-
duces the vision of the 'child' actually exists 
(p. 125). 
The formal myths and religions telling of the child serve 
the purpose of bringing the image of the child in the uncon-
scious into an unbroken line with the consciousness. 
The conscious mind can focus sharply on only a few 
objects at a time, necessarily excluding other potential 
objects of attention. This exclusion brings about a one-
sidedness, a differentiated mind, which is an effective 
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instrument of the will, but which separates man further 
from his childhood psychological roots, leaving him in 
"danger of being uprooted; hence it [consciousness] needs 
compensation through the still existing state of childhood" 
(Jung, 1958, p. 126). 
As the evolution of the embryonic body repeats 
its prehistory, so the mind also develops through 
a series of prehistoric stages. The main task of 
dreams is to bring back a sort of 'recollection' of 
the prehistoric as well as the infantile world, 
right down to the level of the most primitive 
instincts (Jung, 1964, p. 89). 
Application of the Model to Current Trends 
A broad example of different psychological organi-
zations corresponding to cultural differentiation is appar-
entbetween countries of the East and the West. At the 
risk of oversimplifying the situation for convenience, 
Westerners are generally considered to be dominant in left 
hemisphere thinking, while Easterners are more adept at 
using the right hemisphere. What caused this cultural di-
chotomy (which corresponds to physiological and psycho-
logical dichotomies} is still an unresolved issue for 
anthropologists. As environmental conditions change, so 
may psychological organizations, in order to adapt. Cur-
rently, there is an influx of Eastern philosophy into 
Western culture, just as the East is rapidly adopting the 
ways of the West. The split-brain model contains the 
assumption that either mode, in itself, is insufficient. 
The major problem is defining what the optimal relation 
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between the two hemispheres is and how to educate for their 
proper integration, allowing for the best of both. 
Many scientists have speculated on the nature of 
intelligence and the use of nonlinear thought to understand 
aspects of the universe not easily conceptualized. Some 
imply that children have an intuitive understanding of cer-
tain aspects of reality, not readily grasped by modern 
adults dependent on verbal logic. Einstein is said to have 
believed that his difficulty learning language was actually 
an advantage for him when thinking about physics, since he 
was not limited by the inherent constraints of linguistic 
thought (Priestley, 1964). Another physicist and the 
developer of the atomic bomb, Robert Oppenheimer, 
believed that there were children playing in the 
street who could solve some of the most difficult 
problems in physics because they possessed modes 
of sensory perception that he felt had been lost 
in his development (Rennels, 1977, pp. 69-70). 
Capra (1975) concludes from relativity and quantummechanics 
that there is a unity of all things, the universe is inter-
related, human consciousness should be included in the des-
cription of the universe, and the notion of observer as 
separate from the observation is replaced by the notion of 
the participator. This world view is incongruent with that 
of Newtonian logic and the thinking of modern society, but 
it is reminiscent of the description of the child's mind 
provided by Piaget. 
Becoming limited by a single perspective has given rise 
to arguments in some academic fields concerning what is the 
best perspective. In the field of literary criticism, some 
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critics believe that a piece of literature is best under-
stood by scrutinizing and analyzing each part, whereas 
others take a phenomenological perspective, emphasizing the 
work as a whole and attending to the impression the liter-
ature creates as it is read. The respective acts of 
analyzing and of appreciating the immediate aspects of the 
reading are both important to the complete understanding of 
a piece of literature. While these two approaches to 
criticism may be used to complement each other, it seems 
that some critics have a marked preference for one over the 
other. 
Within society today are events which require a reor-
ganization of the relationships among mental processes. 
With the advent of equal rights for women, the value of 
basic behavioral stereotypes are being challenged, and other 
lifestyles are being experimented with. Women are taking 
active and aggressive roles, and must must relinquish pre-
viously unquestioned positions of dominance. Men also now 
may have fewer inhibitions about expressing feelings. 
Advances in technology make space travel possible, and 
plans for colonizing outer space are being discussed. 
Dealing with the problems of high-speed space travel re-
quires a working understanding of relativity theory. As 
was mentioned in the introduction, some physicists consider 
language and the linear model a handicap to some extent in 
understanding modern principles of physics, suggesting that 
ability to use the right hemisphere may be an advantage in 
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understanding problems of space travel. Not being suscep-
tible to the SWI may be important in judging density of 
objects outside a planet's gravity field. 
The solution to such global problems as overpopulation, 
food shortage, and pollution, proposed by economists who see 
more as better and specializ-ation of vocations as an aid 
toward productivity, are often in conflict with the views of 
ecologists, who are concerned with the relations of the parts 
of a biological system to the whole. Ecologists perceive 
highly specialized technology a threat to the stability of 
the whole ecosystem, inasmuch as technologists emphasize 
maximizing one variable at the expense of the other. The 
current economic approaches to global problems often are 
exploitative and destructive to the balance of nature and 
lead to side effects which become problems over the long 
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run. Lester Brown (in Silverstone, 1978) believes develop-
ment and survival will require that fields such as economics 
have as their goal the balance of nature, rather than the 
technological conquest of natural forces. The new paradigm 
remains to be seen, and resistance to abandoning old 
theories is strong; nevertheless, a better working model may 
require suspending dependence on old methods of analysis to 
allow for the input of broader consideration's. 
In these changing times, characterized by high mobility 
and revolutions in nearly all cultural institutions and 
fields of knowledge, Americans form and dissolve social re-
lationships faster than their forefathers, who lived in a 
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society of fairly enduring contact with the same people and 
the same world view. Not only are social systems changing 
at an accelerating pace, but language and man's relation-
ship to it, as well. Discoveries in all fields of 
knowledge require that one learn new vocabularies and theo-
retical frameworks and set aside outdated ways of thinking 
about things. Toffler (1970) states that there are neuro-
logical limits to how much change persons can adapt to, 
before experiencing the effects of great stress, or Future 
Shock. Technological progression is likely to continue, 
and problems, such as energy shortages, will require highly 
skilled and specialized technologists to view problems and 
possible solutions within broad parameters that embrace 
other tangentially related systems. 
Disciplines need to relate their knowledge of society 
in general, and education is no exception. A new conscious-
ness, an "experientially based 'synergistic,' subjective, 
and integrated view of the world" (Wagshal, 1974, p. 129), 
has begun to emerge in recent decades, partly as a result 
of "the combination of mass media, psychedelic drugs, and 
jet flight, which has allowed students to make a quantum 
leap in consciousness over their parents" (p. 131). Edu-
cational reformers should attempt to understand and allow 
for the emerging new consciousness "mainly concerned with 
imagination, spontaneity, communality, and the integration 
of subject matter into the self" (Wagshal, p. 130), in this 
era of rapid change and no firm values, when a curriculum is 
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"overhauled just in time to be out of date" (p. 130). Many 
of the writers of the new consciousness are critical of the 
scientific method and the inappropriateness of natural 
science methods for social science. 
Daniel Brown (1975), for one, is critical of the use 
of the linear model, as exemplified by analysis of variance 
and multiple regression, for educational research. The 
dependent variable - independent variable paradigm .is not 
appropriate where there is not some justification for be-
lieving such a relationship exists. The meaning of statis-
tical significance is a problem, because the magnitude of a 
significant relationship may be actually quite low and not 
generalizable. Correlations that are relatively low (.3 to 
.5), but statistically significant, may suggest that the 
researcher's theory is not very accurate. In looking at 
cause-effect relationships, a dynamic view is needed in lieu 
of a static application of the linear model, which does not 
allow for time delays. Brown recommends that other educa-
tional researchers be less concerned with quantitative 
analysis and suggests a return to historical, legal, and 
logical analysis, including such variations as multivariate 
analysis and the optimization model often used by economists. 
Conclusions of the Review 
The preceding review has attempted to illustrate some 
important principles of problem solving in general. There 
is .more than one way to perceive the world. Furthermore, 
different perspectives tend to be mutually exclusive: to 
view a problem from a given perspective or frame of ref-
erence is to limit the viewer from any other vantage. Ef-
fective use of primary and secondary processes may help a 
person select the best viewpoint from which to operate. 
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Also implied in this review is the notion of noncon-
ceptual thought, with the inference that there are some 
aspects of reality which cannot be understood and expressed 
in logical language. Nevertheless, there is the.character-
istic of the mind which seeks to understand and does so by 
forming symbols and building models of the reality it seeks 
to comprehend. Science, as the search for knowledge, is not 
necessarily tied to the linear model; other methods m~y be 
available to be explored later. As the preceding discussion 
has tried to demonstrate, the linear model is inappropriate 
for psychology, to the extent that not all aspects of the 
mind are linear. And yet science shares with other philos-
ophies (and precausalism in childhood) the quest for a 
teleological cause or an all-encompassing explanation--a 
principle from which all else is derived. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
The literature is essentially speculative concerning 
the relationship of learning that occurs within a·public 
school curriculum to the primary process. The following 
methodology was used to determine if a significant rela-
tionship exists between school achievement and the primary 
process. According to the model of Ornstein (1972), school 
achievement is, in part, causally related to a shift from 
the primary to the secondary process; however, as a cor-
relational study, any obtained significant relationship may 
only lend support to the model. A causal relationship can-
not be inferred necessarily from the results. 
Hypotheses 
H1 Animistic thinking is negatively related to age .• 
H2 Animistic thinking is negatively related to school 
achievement, even after controlling for age. 
H3 The size-weight illusio_n is positively related to age. 
H4 The size-weight illusion is positively related to 
school achievement, even after controlling for age. 
H5 Animistic thinking is negatively related to the size-
weight illusion. 
A6 
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Subjects 
The subjects used were 105 elementary students (47 
males, 58 females) ranging in age from 6 years, 8 months to 
10 years, 2 months; 35 students were selected from grade-
levels one, two, and three, respectively, of an elementary 
school in northcentral Oklahoma. The surrounding area is 
rural, and many of the students' families are farmers. The 
elementary school places emphasis on the 3 R's and utilizes 
the Spalding method of reading instruction, in which children 
are taught to analyze a word by breaking it into phonetic 
parts. The author had worked in the elementary school for 
two years, was acquainted with many of the subjects, and 
often had come in contact with the various subjects in 
classes. 
Procedures 
The SRA test was administered in the classroom during 
the school days March 13 and 14, 1978, by the regular class-
room teachers, according to procedures outlined by the SRA 
test administration instructions. The tests of animistic 
thinking and size-weight illusion were administered one 
subject at a time, by the author, in a small office separate 
from the classroom, on the school days April 25 to May 16, 
1978. Each child was escorted from his classroom to the 
test room and back by the author. After being seated, the 
child was asked if he would answer some questions, and he 
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was told that the author would like to see how well the 
child could do some things. The animism questionnaire was 
administered first. Next, the child was asked to stand and 
move over to a counter in the same room, where the twenty-
nine small weighted bottles were arranged in order. The 
size-weight illusion test was administered, after which the 
child was returned to his classroom. There were two or 
three sections of each class/grade at the elementary school. 
In order to get 35 subjects at each grade, all the students 
from one class were selected, and the remainder needed to 
complete the 35 for each grade level were taken from another 
section of the grade. Selection of those remaining students 
was made with the permission of the teachers. Scheduling of 
activities in the school and location of the students when 
time was available for testing necessarily influenced the 
selection of some students. 
Measuring Devices 
SRA Assessment Survey, Achievement Series, 
Primary Edition 
The SRA is an achievement test to measure student 
growth in reading, mathematics, and language arts. The test 
was designed from the results of 118,000 pupils tested, and 
there may be some question as to how representative of the 
general population these norms are, depending upon a par-· 
ticular school's curriculum. The Kuder-Richardson reli-
ability coefficients are in the .88 or above range generally; 
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no equivalent forms reliability data are reported. Content 
validity is claimed, inasmuch as the test was constructed 
to measure commonly expected outcomes in public schools 
(which may not be appropriate for a given school); no con-
current validity is reported (Buros, 1970). The total raw 
score from the SRA is used as a measure of school achieve-
ment. Two levels of the test were used--grade one had 159 
items; grades two and three had 175 items. Procedures for 
adjusting for the two levels of the SRA are explained in 
the Statistics section. 
Animism Scale 
As explained in Chapter I, animism is considered a 
function of the primary process, and a test of animism 
shall be an operational definition of the primary process. 
The animism scale of Laurendeau and Pinard (1962) was used 
to validate the existence of precausal thinking in children. 
Laurendeau and Pinard attempted to gather a completely rep-
resentative stratified sample (N = 500) , selected on the 
basis of age, sex, occupational .level of parents, familial 
environment, physical condition, siblings, and academic 
level of students of Montreal, Canada, during the 1955-1956 
school year. The authors report no reliability coeffi-
cients on their own test, considering it a refinement of an 
earlier research device which reported split-half coeffi-
cients in the 70's. These researchers consider the exis-
tence of childhood animism unquestionable because of the 
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large number of subjects who attributed life to one or more 
inanimate objects; only 31.5% of the children sampled cor-
rectly classified all the objects in the questionnaire. 
Life, as used in the lowest stage of thinking in children, 
is defined by activity, movement, or usefulness in general. 
Another type of response used by children to classify inan-
imate objects as living is reference to anthropomorphic at-
tributes, such as the ability to breathe, eat, and. see, or 
the possession of a body and soul. Thus, a child may mis-
classify fire as being alive because it "breathes" and 
"eats" things as it burns them up. In this case, animism 
is evident without reference to autonomous movement. Chil-
dren who classify objects on the basis of such traits are 
likely to make errors, thereby giving evidence of their 
precausal-animistic tendencies. Although the Stage 1 child 
may refer to more than one criterion of classification, his 
thinking is generally consistent; he never uses the same 
reason both to attribute and deny life to an object. For 
instance, objects planted in the ground are considered in-
animate because they can't move; likewise, a fish or snake 
is not alive because neither has feet (anthropomorphism). 
Stage 2 children all make at least some reference to auton-
omous movement, the proper criterion of classification, but 
these children still attribute life to certain inanimate 
objects. Thus, State 2 is essentially a transition between 
Stages 1 and 3. In Stage 3, explanations of classification 
primarily refer to autonomous movement, and so plants may 
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still be misclassified, even though no inanimate objects are 
labeled "alive." Laurendeau and Pinard note that correct 
classification of plants depends more on school learning 
than on "natural, personal development of thought" (p.152). 
The results of Laurendeau and Pinard's study show a de-
crease in the percentages of inanimate objects classified 
as animate as subjects increase in age; also, the children 
attribute life most frequently, and for a longer time, to 
those objects most removed from their direct experience. 
The higher the stage numerically, the less animistic 
thinking there is present; this fact is important in inter-
preting the results (see Statistics section) . 
Size-Weight Illusion Test 
In the size-weight illusion test, the subject 
is presented with a series of 29 small volume 
cylindrical weights, arranged in a semi-circle 
before him. The cylinders are ordered according 
to weight. He is then given three larger cylin-
ders, one at a time, and instructed to place 
each one in the series of small cylinders, in 
accordance with its weight, so that the small 
cylinder to its left seems lig~ter than it and 
the small cylinder to its right seems heavier 
than it. He is scored according to how far away 
from its true position he places each large 
weight, without regard to direction. For example, 
if a particular large weight ought to go between 
numbers 22 and 23, and a S places it between 
numbers 17 and 18, then he receives a score of 5. 
The score recorded for each S is a total of three 
such deviation scores, one for each large weight 
placed (Pearl, 1972, p. 30). 
The weights in the small bottles in the ordered series 
ranged from 74 g to 186 g, in intervals of 4 g. The 
weights of the three large bottles were 140 g, 160 g, and 
180 g, respectively. The size of the small bottles was 
2-3/8 inches tall and 1 inch in diameter; the size of the 
large bottles was 3-3/8 inches tall and 1-5/8 inches in 
diameter. 
52 
A historical review, primarily of European research, 
indicates that the SWI is acquired sometime in childhood 
and has a very high frequency of appearance in the general 
population; moreover, it may depend on the development of 
intelligence (Nyssen and Bourdon, 1956). Because most of 
this literature is written in a foreign language, it cannot 
be evaluated.in relation to the present study. 
Koseloff (1958) describes a difficulty with measuring 
the SWI--the SWI phenomenon is not ''robust." In testing 
for the SWI, a subject may show a large error in his judge-
ment of heaviness on an initial comparison, but on a later 
comparison· of weights show less of an error in judgement, 
or a judgement in the opposite direction: initially the 
large object is judged heavier, subsequently it is judged 
lighter than the small object. This might indicate that 
the SWI was present in one phase of measurement but not in 
later phases. However, after a brief rest, the subject 
would again display the SWI phenomenon. That a subject may 
not always demonstrate a SWI indicates that measurement of 
the SWI in this study may not be reliable. 
As to whether or not the SWI is related to age and in-
telligence, Koseloff (1957) and Nyssen and Bourdon (1955) 
find the SWI clinically worthless for discriminating normal 
subjects from the mentally defective, senile, paretic de-
mentia, oliogophrenic, or brain-damaged subjects. 
Statistics 
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Simple and partial correlation coefficients were com-
puted to analyze the data. Since the SRA test used con-
sisted of two levels with different -numbers of items, the 
influence of grade on SRA scores was controlled by sub-
tracting the SRA variance accounted for by grade, from the 
total variance accounted for in correlation of SRA with any 
other variable. 
Since grade and stage (of animistic thinking) are both 
variables indicating a subject's me~bership in a category 
(nqminal variables) , they were encoded as dummy variables 
in a regression equation, with SRA as the dependent vari-
able. The procedure allowed for the computation of corre-
lation coefficients on data which were not appropriate for 
Pearson's correlation technique. The Statistical Package 
for Social Sciences (SPSS) computer program (Nie et al., 
1975) was used to compute the results. 
A regression equation was set up with SRA the dependent 
variable; grade, age, and stage of animistic thinking (or 
SWI for H4 ) were then added, in that order. This procedure 
allowed for control first, of the effect of grade level on· 
SRA, then of the effect of age over what was accounted for 
by grade. The variance of SRA accounted for by stage (or 
SWI), over and above or after controlling for grade and age, 
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was obtained by subtracting the variance of SRA, accounted 
for by grade and age, from the total variance of SRA ac-
counted for by age, grade, and stage (or SWI). 
Two things must be pointed out with regard to the 
animism scale. First, only three stages of response were 
used; no subjects in the sample gave a Stage 0 (incom-
prehension or refusal) response. Therefore, Stage 0 was 
left out in the analysis of results. Secondly, on the 
animism scale, a low score indicates more animistic 
thinking than a high score, so a statistically positive 
correlation between measures of animistic thinking and 
school achievement would actually indicate a negative re-
lationship between the variables. With regard to Hypo-
theses 1, 2, and 5, therefore, the relationship should be 
negative, but positive statistical correlations should be 
obtained, due to numbering the stages of animistic thinking 
in reverse order. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
This section presents statistical analyses of the data 
obtained from the subjects. Table I shows the means and 
standard deviations for each variable and indicates the 
range and variability of the scores. Table II presents the 
correlations and illustrates the relationships among the 
variables in the study, which may be of interest to the 
reader in interpreting the results of the research. The 
simple or adjusted correlations will be presented sepa-
rately for each variable. 
Variable 
Stage 
SWI 
SRA 
Grade 
Age 
TABLE I 
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR 
VARIABLES IN THE STUDY 
Mean 
1. 9 333 
51.1524 
118.2857 
2.0000 
97.8476 
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Std 
Dev. 
0.8235 
11.5947 
27.0568 
0.8204 
11.0173 
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TABLE II 
MATRIX OF ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS 
Stage SWI SRA Grade Age 
Stage 1. 0 000 0.1491 0.2809 0.2277 0.1430 
SWI 0 .1491 1.0000 0.2173 0.1021 0.0904 
SRA 0.2809 0.2173 1. 0000 0.1287 0.0164 
Grade 0.2277 0.1021 0.1287 1.0000 0.9149 
Age 0.1430 0.0904 0.0164 0.9149 1.0000 
H1 : Animistic thinking is negatively related to age. 
The statistical correlation between stage of animistic 
thinking and age is .1529. The correlation between age and 
stage is the Multiple R of a regression equation with age 
as the dependent variable and stage the independent vari-
able, coded as dummy variables. The F ratio of 1.2213 
(df 2,102) does not reach the tabled value for significance 
at the .05 level of probability. Hypothesis number one is 
not supported by the results. 
The above statistical method indicates no significant 
relationship between age and stage. However, Table III 
shows a frequency count of more children in grade one dis-
playing Stage 1 of animistic thinking than any other group. 
As the grade (and thus age, since age and grade are cor-
related r = . 9149) goes up, there are fewer students showing 
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Stage 1 thinking and more showing Stage 3·thinking. Cau-
tion must be exercised when discussing observed frequency 
data which are statistically non-significant. 
Stage 
1 
2 
3 
TABLE III 
NUMBER OF SUBJECTS IN EACH STAGE 
FOR EACH GRADE 
1 
17 
12 
6 
Grade 
2 
12 
12 
11 
H2 : Animistic thinking is negatively related to 
school achievement, even after controlling for age. 
3 
10 
10 
15 
The obtained correlation for H2 is .268. This corre-
lation coefficient is the result of applying the formula 
R2 - R2 y·l,2, ..• k y·l,2, ... k 
l' 2 
to the R2 's of regression equations 
RSRA • GRADE, AGE, STAGE (R 2 = · 152 36) 
and 
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RSRA •GRADE, AGE (R 2 = · 08049 ) 
The F ratio of 4.197 (df 2,99), not computed for this 
partial by the SPSS program, was computed with the formula 
F= 
(R 2 - R 2 ) I (k - k ) y·l,2, ... k y·l,2, ... k. l 2 
l 2 
(l-R 2 y. 1,2, .•. k) I (N-kl-1) 
1 
(Kerlinger, 1973, p. 71). 
The result is higher than the tabled value of 3.94 for the 
.05 level of significance; thus Hypothesis two is 
supported. 
As explained in the Statistics section of Chapter III, 
a statistically positive correlation between measures of 
animistic thinking and SRA scores (and age also) would 
actually indicate a negative relationship between vari-
ables, as the stages of .animism are numbered so that a 
score of one indicates the most animism; a score of three, 
the least. Also, with the omission of Stage 0, the degrees 
of freedom are figured for one less group than the animism 
scale allowed for. 
H3 : The size-weight illusion is positively related to 
age. 
The correlation coefficient obtained is .0904. The P 
of .18 is greater than .05, the value required for signifi-
cance, and so Hypothesis three is not supported. 
Unlike Table III, which shows an increase in frequency 
of Stage 3 thinking (arid a decrease in Stage 1 thinking) 
59 
with increasing grade level, a breakdown of mean SWI by 
grade does not show a linear increase in SWI with increase 
in grade (and thus age), as Table IV shows. 
Grade 
1 
2 
3 
TABLE IV 
MEAN SWI SCORES FOR 
EACH GRADE 
Mean SWI 
61.9 g 
49.42 g 
54 g 
H4 : The size-weight illusion is positively related to 
school achievement, even after controlling for age. 
The correlation of the size-weight illusion and the 
SRA, after controlling for age, is .2077. This correlation 
coefficient was obtained using the same formulas as were 
used in Hypothesis two, to the R2 's of the regression 
equations 
RSRA • SWI, GRADE, AGE (R 2 = · 1 2 36 2 ) 
and 
RSRA •GRADE, AGE (R 2 = .OS0 49 ) 
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The F ratio of 4.92138 (df 1,100) is larger than the tabled 
value for .OS level of significance; thus Hypothesis four 
is supported. 
HS:· Animistic thinking is negatively related to the 
size-weight illusion. 
The obtained correlation for this hypothesis is .2381. 
This correlation coefficient is the multiple R of a re-
gression equation with SWI as the dependent variable and 
stage coded as dummy variables. The tabled value for a 
significant F at .OS is 3.09, which is slightly higher than 
the obtained F ratio of 3.06429 (df 2,102). Thus Hypo-
thesis five is not supported. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
Some educators have claimed that children lose certain 
mental abilities with cognitive development, and that 
learning in the verbal-logical mode is one cause of the 
loss. This phenomenon may be understood within a dualistic 
model, in which there is a primary process--not subject to 
the restrictions of logic and defined here as animistic and 
not susceptible to the size-weight illusion--as well as a 
secondary process, which is characterized by language and 
logic. Skills of the secondary process are learned by the 
child through social interaction, as well as through formal 
instruction in reading,- writing, and arithmetic. The 
secondary process dominates and suppresses the primary 
process. 
It was hypothesized that age is negatively related to 
animistic thinking (as measured by the test of Laurendeau 
and Pinard) and positively related to the size-weight il-
lusion (as measured by the size-weight illusion test of 
Pearl) , indicating that children may have some mental 
abilities which are lost as they get older. It was also 
hypothesized that school achievement in the verbal-logical 
·skills of reading, writing, and arithmetic (as measured by 
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the SRA Assessment Survey) is negatively related to both 
measures of the primary process (animistic thinking and the 
size-weight illusion), after controlling for age; this 
would suggest that learning in the secondary process inter-
feres with the primary process. Finally, it was hypo-
thesized that animistic thinking and the size-weight il-
lusion are negatively related, which would indicate that 
there is a unified group of mental abilities which can be 
regarded as part of the same primary process. To test 
these hypotheses, test results on the SRA, the size-weight 
illusion test, and the animistic thinking scale were ob-
tained from 105 first, second, and third graders (35 
subjects from each grade); results were analyzed with cor-
relation and multiple regression techniques. 
That age is not significantly related to stage of 
animism may initially suggest that there is no transition 
from a lower to a higher stage as children get older. This 
result contradicts that of Torrance (1972), who found a 
significant difference between fourth graders and sixth 
graders. However, Torrance used older subjects and a 
different statistical tool and focused on the impact of 
culture and socioeconomic status on causal thinking. Smeets 
(1974) found that the attribution of life and life traits 
was dependent on an interaction of mental age and chrono-
logical age, neither variable alone accounting for the 
subjects' responses. The statistical procedure was one of 
testing the difference in performance for selected groups 
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of normal and retarded children. And, as mentioned earlier, 
Piaget has said that age itself is unimportant in deter-
mining stage of cognitive development, while experience is 
crucial. Since no significant relationship between age and 
stage was found in this study, there must be other factors 
involved in the development of thinking and the shift in 
mode of thought. 
School achievement is negatively related to animistic 
thinking, and so these results are consistent with the 
theory that verbal-logical learning is involved in the loss 
of the primary process. Nevertheless, there is still some 
room to doubt the theory. Lack of longitudinal studies, 
incidence of animistic thinking in adults, and lack of age 
as a significant variable permit the interpretation that 
animistic thinking is a matter of individual cognitive 
style. A person may consistently display a preference for 
one mode or the other throughout.his life. This does not 
seem likely, however, considering the evidence for mallea-
bility in the development of the mind presented in Chapter 
II. 
The results for Hypotheses three, four, and five may 
all be suspect. First, there is Koseloff 's research, 
showing measurement of the size-weight illusion to be un-
reliable. More important is this author's suspicion that 
the weight-judging tasks presented to the subjects, to-
gether with the basic instructions (i.e., to place the 
large bottle in the line of small bottles so that the one 
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to the left weighed less, and the one to the right weighed 
more) were not understood by many of the students. Some-
times a child would place the large bottle in the line, 
without making a comparison of weight with any of the small 
bottles; some children only made a few comparisons and 
placed the bottles in the line near bottles they had not 
lifted. Extra explanations and directions were provided in 
the manner of asking the child to pick up and to feel 
several of the weights and then to judge which felt heavieL 
The mean SWI scores for each grade (Table IV) do not 
show an increase as grade goes up, whereas there is an in-
crease in Stage 3 thinking and a decrease in Stage 1 
thinking as grade goes up. Thus, using animism as the 
operational definition of the primary process fits the model 
better than SWI. Because of the problems mentioned above, 
the results for Hypothesis four may not be reliable evi-
dence to support the model, even though SWI has about the 
same relationship to school achievement as animism. Since 
Hypothesis five is not significant, one might theorize that 
the primary process is more accurately a composite of inde-
pendent factors, but one cannot assume the results of the 
SWI test to be meaningful. 
Animism, allowing for anything to be alive, is in con-
tradiction to the conclusions of scientific biologyi 
exactly what it means to be alive is still open to debate, 
at any rate. Likewise, animistic thinking and school 
achievement are negatively related; the low correlation may 
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be interpreted to mean that the two modes are slightly, 
but not totally, in conflict. Also, there are other still 
unidentified variables which may account for variance in 
each mode. As with many human behaviors, animistic 
thinking may be interpreted to be the product of both modes 
of functioning. First, the child uses the right hemisphere, 
specialized in simultaneous processing and closure upon, 
wholeness of perceptions. When the child--who has not yet 
fully mastered language and logic--expresses his per-
ceptions and ideas, he resorts to precausalism, which is 
contrary to logic, but reflects percepts of unity and 
wholeness in references to all things being oriented to a 
single purpose by a single source. Likewise, the concept 
of a unified universe could be one way by which a right 
hemisphere perception is imperfectly, but usefully, 
expressed through the left hemisphere's verbal language. 
Since results show that a primary-grade child in a 
public school that is high in school achievement is likely 
to be low in animistic thinking, the implications from the 
model of avoiding conceptualization when using the primary 
process and providing activities to help develop the pri-
mary process are in order. Since age is not significantly 
related, there is no basis for delaying formal education. 
An experimental study may show whether or not teaching of 
the 3 R's does, in fact, result in less ability to use the 
right hemisphere functions; the effects of simply not exer-
cising the primary process should be controlled for, to 
66 
eliminate lack of experience as the cause of the loss of an 
ability. It would also be useful to determine if activi-
ties designed to promote primary processing skills do lead 
to improved mental health, heightened problem-solving 
ability, and deeper understanding of such subjects as rela-
tivity, which are not easily conceptualized. 
The appropriateness of the simple dualistic model for 
classifying arid explaining the relationships between abil-
ities may be further explored. Some of the results of this 
research are consistent with the model of Ornstein; however, 
other than school achievement, there are still variables--
yet unidentified--which may account for more of the vari-
ance. More recent research indicates that the laterali-
zation of hemispheric function is less prevalent in women 
than men, suggesting that the two modes may be negatively 
related only in male subjects. Also, each mode may be 
composed of several independent subabilities: within the 
SRA, reading, writing, and arithmetic may not all relate to 
stage of animism to the same extent or in the same 
direction. Some evidence indicates that arithmetic is a 
right hemisphere function, at least in part. It may be 
useful to consider the relative contribution of each mode 
to a given behavioral outcome. 
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GRADE 1 
Age in SWI in 
Subject Months Stage SRA Grams 
1 83 1 112 50 
2 89 1 80 16 
3 85 2 84 62 
4 82 1 128 56 
5 83 1 82 60 
6 83 2 132 48 
7 81 3 79 59 
8 90 2 119 41 
9 90 1 144 46 
10 90 1 72 55 
11 84 1 122 42 
12 96 1 117 59 
13 94 2 109 61 
14 89 2 122 46 
15 80 3 148 48 
16 81 1 65 43 
17 88 1 152 57 
18 88 2 120 60 
19 85 2 .105 60 
20 84 2 112 46 
21 80 1 126 13 
22 80 2 116 62 
23 79 1 111 42 
24 78 1 123 59 
25 83 1 141 55 
26 88 1 121 56 
27 91 3 103 43 
28 83 3 111 49 
74 
Age in SWI in 
Subject Months Stage SRA Grams 
29 83 2 103 56 
30 89 3 118 58 
31 85 2 83 43 
32 91 3 110 54 
33 85 1 132 5.7 
34 82 1 140 57 
35 91 3 140 50 
75 
GRADE 2 
Age in SWI in 
Subject Months Stage SRA Grams 
1 97 2 129 56 
2 94 2 70 22 
3 94 3 129 3 
4 106 1 51 29 
5 104 1 85 38 
6 95 2 134 60 
7 96 2 136 52 
8 96 1 155 62 
9 98 3 156 62 
10 95 3 126 55 
11 100 3 148 22 
12 94 2 153 67 
13 104 1 53 52 
14 91 1 101 44 
. 15 101 2 157 61 
16 ·95 3 139 57 
17 93 3 134 48 
18 109 1 82 59 
19 93 .1 138 34 
20 98 1 115 53 
21 92 1 89 42 
22 96 3 156 61 
23 103 2 75 50 
24 103 3 98 40 
25 101 3 151 60 
26 97 3 118 54 
27 99 1 78 60 
28 96 2 134 58 
76 
Age in SWI in 
Subject Months Sta9:e SRA Grams 
29 98 3 115 61 
30 102 2 149 60 
31 100 2 139 51 
32 90 1 117 59 
33 96 2 122 58 
34 102 2 157 60 
35 100 1 98 22 
77 
GRADE 3 
Age in SWI in 
Subject Months Stage SRA Grams 
1 114 1 126 34 
2 110 2 155 52 
3 109 1 119 53 
4 112 1 68 57 
5 108 2 123 45 
6 118 1 66 40 
7 112 2 146 60 
8 102 3 79 61 
9 112 2 119 60 
10 122 1 56 58 
11 111 2 152 55 
12 106 2 117 47 
13 107 3 127 45 
14 104 3 136 57 
15 105 3 140 55 
16 106 3 129 54 
17 119 1 88 37 
18 104 2 126 53 
19 113 3 136 61 
20 108 2 125 54 
21 106 2 137 59 
22 113 3 95 60 
23 105 3 140 61 
24 108 3 155 51 
25 111 3 146 57 
26 108 3 84 61 
27 118 3 120 60 
28 109 2 134 57 
78 
Age in SWI in 
Subject Months Stage SRA Grams 
29 111 2 156 61 
30 113 1 97 57 
31 108 3 117 42 
32 113 1 134 60 
33 110 2 127 53 
34 112 1 144 40 
35 106 1 151 53 
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